

Outgroup Trust and Cross Ethnic Voting in New Democracies: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa¹

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Abstract

This study examines the relationship between outgroup trust and cross ethnic voting across new democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. I propose two mechanisms through which outgroup trust influences voting behavior in ethnically salient contexts. The information receptivity mechanism hypothesizes that voters with high levels of outgroup trust and with greater access to information on candidates are more likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate. The collective action mechanism proposes that individuals with high levels of out-group trust and high level of information on the voting intentions of co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic members are less likely to vote for a co-ethnic candidate. I test the relationship between outgroup trust and cross ethnic voting using the Wave 3 Afrobarometer survey data for 10 sub-Saharan new democracies. Results derived from a country fixed effects model show support for the hypothesis that individuals with high levels of outgroup trust are more likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate. This, however, is conditional on one's ethnic group status. Outgroup trust is a significant and positive predictor of cross ethnic voting only among ethnic majority group members. I find no support for the information receptivity mechanism. The collective action hypothesis, on the other hand, is supported, but only among the ethnic minority group members. Ethnic minority respondents that frequently engage in political conversations and has high levels of outgroup trust are more likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic than frequent discussers with low levels of outgroup trust.

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1 Introduction

For many years, scholars have argued that divisions along ethnic lines may be detrimental to the consolidation of democracy (Dahl, 1973; Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1977; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). In societies where people identify strongly with their ethnicity, political outcomes such as voting (Adida, 2015; Barreto, 2007), redistribution (Houle, 2017), and conflict (Caselli and Coleman, 2013; King and Samii, 2020) also tend to be divided along ethnic lines. A strong association between political outcomes and ethnic identity can be harmful to democratic consolidation as it may undermine democratic accountability, political stability, and social harmony.

Voting, a key feature of democracy, has been found to hinder democratic consolidation when it occurs along ethnic lines (Houle, 2018). Ethnic voting is harmful to democracy as it 1) reduces the ex ante uncertainty of voting, 2) encourages patronage politics, and 3) pushes candidates to take extreme policy stances leading to polarization. As a result, countries that vote along ethnic lines may appear to be moving towards democracy, as voting is deemed the essence of democracy, but in actuality, they may be experiencing political patterns that in fact are preventing democratic consolidation. (Houle, 2018)

If ethnic voting is pernicious, what might encourage individuals to vote across ethnic lines? According to the social capital literature, social trust is essential in building a robust democracy as it has been known to decrease discrimination and increase willingness to cooperate with others at the individual level, and improve collective action, economic growth and institutions at the national level (Uslaner, 2002; Bigelow and Tocqueville, 1899; Inglehart, 1999a; Putnam, 1993). Social trusts known ability to bridge individuals and groups, and thus promote democracy brings me to my research question; can an increase in trust across ethnic groups affect individuals voting behavior in contexts where ethnicity is salient?

I argue that the detrimental effect of ethnic diversity on democratic consolidation will be less prominent in contexts where individuals extend trust beyond their own ethnic groups (i.e., display high outgroup trust). In particular, I look at the relationship between the radius of trust (i.e. the level of in- and outgroup trust) and the extent of ethnic voting (Houle, 2018). Since trust and voting behavior vary from individual to individual, I study this question at the individual level. The mechanism through which the radius of trust determines the extent of ethnic voting is a voters propensity to

credit or discredit positive information on non-co-ethnic candidates or parties (information receptivity mechanism).

This study on the role of outgroup trust on democratic consolidation in ethnically diverse and salient settings speaks to a number of literatures. First, this study can add to the ethnic voting literature, particularly to the discussion of the conditions under which ethnicity is a significant predictor of vote choice (Chandra, 2004; Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Posner, 2004; DUNNING and HARRISON, 2010). Second, it can contribute to the on-going debate in the social capital literature on whether and how social trust contributes to democratic development (Almond and Verba, 1989; Inglehart, 1988; Muller and Seligson, 1994a; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003; Rafael La Porta et al., 1997; Putnam, 1993; Rice, 2001; Knack, 2002a; Uslaner, 2002; Bck and Christensen, 2016; Crepaz et al., 2017b). By considering the role of social trust in the relationship between ethnic identity and vote choice, we can not only learn about the extent to which ethnicity becomes the prime heuristic for peoples vote choice, but also whether social trust is a significant predictor of voting behavior in ethnically salient contexts.

The paper will proceed as follows. First, I explain why ethnic voting is important to consider when studying democratic consolidation and how it is detrimental to its progress. This is followed by a brief literature review on possible solutions for the negative consequences of ethnic diversity, including increasing social trust across ethnic lines. Then I describe explanations for why people vote across ethnic lines and discuss how outgroup trust could possibly encourage individuals to vote across ethnic lines. The following section lays out the proposed mechanisms for how outgroup trust could increase the likelihood of individuals voting across ethnic lines, which are the information receptivity and the collective action mechanisms. This is then followed by a empirical and results section.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Ethnic Voting and Democratic Consolidation

A democracy is consolidated, according to Linz and Stepan(1978), when democracy itself is the only game in town. When a change is made, it is made through the democratic processes institutionalized in that country, rather than through authoritarian measures. Diamond(1994) says that a democracy is consolidated when it becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among

its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. The possibility of a single person or party taking power is unlikely to happen, because the norms of democracy have become engrained in the system. A key component of both these characterizations of consolidation is elections. While consolidation also includes rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a robust civil society, competitive elections are the base upon which these other factors build (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

Competitive elections guarantee a continuation of democracy because the contestation between candidates or parties prevents a single authority from staying in power indefinitely (Przeworski, 2000). Ethnic voting or voting using ethnic cues to decide who to vote for, on the other hand, can be detrimental for democratic consolidation as it can undermine the competitive electoral process. According to Houle (2018), ethnic voting poses a danger to democratic consolidation for three reasons: ethnic voting 1) reduces ex ante uncertainty of voting, which is a fundamental characteristic of democracy (Przeworski, 2000), 2) encourages patronage politics (Chandra, 2004), and 3) pushes candidates to take extreme policy stances leading to polarization (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Chandra, 2004; Houle, 2018).

The first point refers to Przeworski's definition of democracy, which he defines as a system in which incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules so dictate (Przeworski, 2000) (54). The key characteristic of democracy he argues is contestation in the form of elections. For elections to be considered legitimate, they must fulfill three criteria: 1) ex-ante uncertainty (anyone can win), ex-post irreversibility (losers do not try to reverse results), and repeatability (Przeworski, 2000) (16). Ethnic voting makes it highly likely that the first criteria, ex ante uncertainty, will be violated. When politics are divided along ethnic lines, politicians are likely to appeal to their co-ethnic voters and those voters are more likely to vote for them. Since ethnicity is a sticky trait, voting along ethnic lines make the electoral outcomes more predictable. As ethnicity becomes more important to the voters, the demographics of the country will pre-determine who the winner and loser will be. An example of a country in which ethnicized politics has led to long term rule for particular parties is Kenya. Here, politics have always been dominated by parties led by Kikuyus, the biggest ethnic group in Kenya. On the other hand, in places where ethnicity is not the key factor for vote choice, the electoral outcomes will be more difficult to determine as voters may be more likely to switch parties based on their policies and past performances.

Decreased unpredictability of electoral outcomes is bad for democracy as it undermines the legitimacy of the institution, which then discourages electoral losers from participating in future elections and having trust in their outcomes. Since they are likely to find the electoral results untrustworthy, they will have little interest in supporting the regime. Rather, they may have an incentive to undermine democracy by staging a coup and installing a government led by their ethnic group or not partaking in electoral processes which further decreases their legitimacy. Groups in power, on the other hand, may try to consolidate their power by weakening the rule of law, taking away minority rights, or even by staging self-coups. All of these efforts from either side can lead to the fall of democracy.

A second mechanism through which ethnic voting can erode democracy is by encouraging patronage politics. Patronage politics refers to a spoils system in which electoral winners exchange favors for votes. In places where votes are based on the candidates ethnicity, incumbents are less interested in the well-being of their citizens as a whole and more focused on pleasing their co-ethnic constituents. As a result, the incumbent is less likely to distribute public goods that benefit the country as a whole and more likely to give up patronage goods (e.g., provide public sector jobs) to their supporters. On the other hand, countries that do not vote along ethnic lines are more likely to eschew patronage politics and instead incumbents are likelier to appeal to all voters by providing public goods to the whole population(Chandra, 2004).

Patronage politics excludes electoral losers from accessing state resources, which in turn harms their well-being. Being excluded from accessing well-paid jobs can directly harm their socio-economic status, which in turn increases the economic inequality between the electoral winners and losers. The inequality then becomes a source of grievance leading to conflict that erodes and destabilizes democracy(Houle, 2018).

Lastly, ethnic voting can harm democracy via ethnic out-bidding and resulting polarization. Ethnic out-bidding refers to the process where elites within the same group compete for votes by taking on a more extreme position than the other. When voting is primarily based on ethnicity, appealing to non-co-ethnic voters becomes impossible. As a result, candidates become more and more polarized in their stance as they try to outbid their competing co-ethnic candidate. The radicalized policies and rhetoric drive ethnic and co-ethnic groups further apart from one another, which can then lead to an emergence of pernicious polarization, a phenomenon where a society splits

into mutually distrustful us versus them camps(McCoy et al., 2018). In an extremely polarized environment, politicians are motivated to appeal to voters by proposing extreme policies, which favor co-ethnics and discriminate against non-co-ethnics. Voters, on the other hand, are influenced to loath, fear and distrust non-co-ethnics, which can in worst case scenarios lead to civil unrest and conflict(Bhavnani and Miodownik, 2009; Devotta, 2005).

Polarization along ethnic lines, according to McCoy and Somer(2019), is especially detrimental to democracy as compared to cleavages based on issues or values. This is because cleavages formed around identity and belonging raises the question (of) who has the right to live in a polity as a full citizen and whether one group can claim exclusive legitimacy to represent the citizens in the government(McCoy and Somer, 2019) (263-64). Since these issues question the very existence of individuals, decisions derived from ethnic politics will directly affect the daily lives of the people. As electoral losers seek to regain power, they may work against the norms of competitive elections. Winners may also work against democratic norms in their attempts to hold onto power(McKenna et al., 2018). With violations of democratic norms from both sides, the country faces the danger of democratic backsliding. Such was the case in Kenya during the 2007 elections, where the incumbents alleged electoral manipulation led to the outbreak of ethnic violence targeting the incumbents ethnic group.

Empirical studies support the theorized detrimental effect of ethnic voting on democracy. Results from Houles(2018) study on ethnic voting and democracy across 58 democracies indicate a negative relationship between ethnic voting and democracy. To measure ethnic voting, Houle calculated the degree to which people of a given group vote for different parties than other groups of the same country. The score ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that members of group i vote in exactly the same way as other groups from the same country and 1 where members of group i vote strictly along ethnic lines. For levels of democracy, he used both the Polity score and the Freedom House score. The scores are based on a number of criteria including presence of a competitive election. The score for Polity ranges from -10 to 10, while the latter ranges from one to seven³, where higher scores indicate higher democracy or greater democratic consolidation. If countries score high on these measures, they are more likely to be democratically consolidated, including holding competitive elections. Using these measures, Houle finds

³Houle reversed the Freedom House score so that higher values indicate higher democracy levels.

ethnic voting is significantly correlated with a reduction in the quality of democracy. A country with a Polity score of 6.0, for example, would have a Polity score of 6.35 if its ethnic voting level (GVF) was at the 5th percentile of the distribution. On the other hand, if the same country's ethnic voting level were at the 95th percentile of the distribution, its Polity score would be reduced to 5.93.

2.2 Social Trust and Political Participation

Given that ethnic voting appears to be detrimental to democratic consolidation via its impact on voting behavior, how can we discourage voting along ethnic lines? Social capital scholarship provides insight into how social trust can encourage people to vote across ethnic lines.

According to the social capital literature, social trust is a key foundation for democratic consolidation. Social trust is defined as a general disposition to what extent one trusts strangers or unfamiliar others (Uslaner, 2012, 2002). It has been argued that social trust makes socioeconomic relationships easier to create as it cuts down transaction costs related to formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and others (Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002; Warren, 2018). Elections is one area that can benefit from associations fostered by social trust. According to Keefer, Scartascini, and Vlaicu (2019), low voter trust in each other is a fundamental concern when it comes to the quality of government. They argue that if voters do not trust their fellow voters to act with them to hold politicians accountable, politicians will have less of a reason to fear the electoral consequences of breaking their promises (Keefer et al., 2019) (2). Using Latin American data, they find a strong correlation between low trust and preferences for policies associated with low quality and populist governments. As such evidence shows, social trust is closely associated with democratic consolidation as it has the ability to encourage collective action in keeping politicians accountable.

Empirical studies provide support for an association between social trust and various aspects of democracy. At the country-level, studies find that social trust, usually measured as the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement most people can be trusted, is a significant predictor of stable democracy, levels of democracy, and years of continuous democracy (Inglehart, 1997, 1999a; Muller and Seligson, 1994b). At the macro-level (e.g., national and community), studies find similar results where social trust is positively

correlated with economic growth(Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000), lower crime rates(Jacobs, 1992; Wilson, 2012), more responsive government(Putnam, 1993), and favorable views of the government(Rice, 2001; Knack, 2002b; La Porta et al., 1999). At the individual-level, high levels of social trust significantly predict high levels of confidence in government (Brehm and Rahn 1997) and higher likelihood of protest(Benson and Rochon, 2004).

On the other hand, absence of social trust has been found to have a detrimental effect on social and political stability. Previous studies on diverse societies, where the level of social trust is generally found to be low(Dinesen et al., 2020), find a positive association with conflict(Varshney, 2009), poor governance(Alesina et al., 1999), low social capital(Alesina and Ferrara, 2005), and poor economic performance(Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997).

In contexts where ethnic identity is salient, social trust towards non-co-ethnics or outgroups matters. When social, political, and economic aspects of life are divided along ethnic lines, non-co-ethnic individuals or groups become potential competitors for resources. Since these non-co-ethnic members or groups are viewed as potential competitors, it is likely that the ability to trust these members and groups would also be low. When trust for non-co-ethnic or outgroup members is low, cooperation across groups will be difficult, which then could have a detrimental effect on social and political stability. Studies examining the relationship between outgroup trust and democracy find that countries with higher levels of outgroup trust are more likely to score higher on the democratic scale. Delhey and co-authors(2011) test the correlation between the radius of trust towards outgroup members and democratic awareness and level of democracy across 51 countries using the World Values Survey data. They find a significant and positive association between trust and two measures of democracy.

At the individual-level, Crepaz and co-authors(2017a) also use World Values Survey data to find that individuals with high levels of outgroup trust participate more actively in nonconventional political activity, such as participating in demonstrations, boycotts, and signing a petition. They also find that the presence of outgroup trust had a slightly negative impact on voting. They explain that outgroup trusters are more likely to engage in unconventional political behavior than conventional ones because they are other regarding, altruistic, and extroverted(Stolle et al., 2005). Their

motivation for political participation lies not only in self-enrichment but also the pursuit of the common good. outgroup trusters, therefore, are more likely to engage in unconventional political activities that can demand change and solve collective problems.

2.3 Non-Co-Ethnic Trust and Ethnic Voting

While previous studies on outgroup trust and democracy show evidence of a positive relationship, scholarship has not addressed how trust across ethnic groups impacts ethnic voting and the mechanisms through which outgroup trust influences voting behaviors. First, studies on outgroup trust and democracy have aggregated multiple trust measures into a single index. Studies using the World Values Survey data construct an outgroup trust index by averaging the level of trust across three groups: people you meet for the first time, people of another religion, and people of another nationality, none of which directly addresses ethnic lines. While the question of religion may capture trust across ethnic groups in some contexts, it may not be the case for countries where ethnicity and religious diversity do not overlap with one another. As a result, the question of trust towards people of another religion would not capture the ethnic tension the country is suffering from. By looking specifically at non-co-ethnic trust, one form of outgroup trust, I hope to better understand the relationship between outgroup trust and democracy.

Second, research on outgroup trust and voting in democracies has yet to look at the effect of non-co-ethnic trust on ethnic voting. Previous studies have looked at the relationship between outgroup trust and the type of political participation individuals engage in, but they did not take into consideration ethnic contexts and how it would alter voting behavior. As a result, this paper seeks to understand the relationship between trust across ethnic groups and individuals motivation to vote along ethnic line. If social trust has the ability to promote democratic behaviors, as per the social capital literature, we should expect to see a decreased motivation to vote along ethnic lines among those with high levels of non-co-ethnic trust. Furthermore, I seek to test the mechanisms through which non-co-ethnic trust influences voting behaviors in ethnically salient contexts. While the literature on social trust and political participation hints at a number of mechanisms through which trust influences voting behavior, they have yet to be explicitly tested for.

3 A Theory of Outgroup Trust and Voting Behavior in New Democracies

3.1 Definitions and Concepts

Trust refers to the belief that others will not act opportunistically to take advantage of them (Keefer et al., 2019). Trust, according to the social capital literature, is considered beneficial for societies as it stimulates cooperation between citizens in general, including those that are divided socially and culturally (Bigelow and Tocqueville, 1899; Uslaner, 2002). Trust, especially trust extended to strangers, enhances feelings of common moral foundations, identity, and norms, all of which motivate people to achieve common goals that contribute to a democratic society (Putnam, 2000; Oskarsson, 2010).

In the context of ethnically divided societies, peoples ability to trust outgroup members, seems like a possible solution to the deleterious consequences of voting along ethnic lines. Here, I theorize that voters who are able to trust individuals outside their identity group, as in voters with a larger radius of trust, are more likely to 1) incorporate information on competing candidates or parties into their voting decision (information receptivity mechanism) and 2) have confidence that non-co-ethnic voters will vote for qualified candidates or parties that will distribute public goods (collective action mechanism).

Before I explain the mechanism underlying the relationship between radius of trust and voting behavior, I will define concepts relevant to the theory. First, radius of trust refers to the width of the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative (Fukuyama, 2000). When the radius of trust is narrow, trust is extended to people who are familiar to you including family members, neighbors, people you know or have met before, people of the same ethnicity, religion, age and so on. This type of trust is also known as particularized, ingroup, specific, or thick trust (Zmerli and Newton, 2008; Delhey et al., 2011). A wide radius of trust, on the other hand, refers to trust in strangers and people whom we have little knowledge about. This type of trust is referred to as generalized, impersonal or thin trust (Gaidyte, 2015). According to Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2011), as the radius of trust increases so does the circle of cooperation. In contexts where ethnicity is a salient identity, thick trust is also referred to as ingroup trust as in these settings, friends and family members usually come from the same ethnic group. Thin trust, on the other hand, is often labeled as outgroup trust or trust extended to those beyond ones ingroup members. In the next section,

I present three possible mechanisms through which the radius of trust can influence the likelihood of voting along ethnic lines.

3.2 Why New Democracies?

In this paper, I test whether the relationship between outgroup trust and voting behavior travels across new democracies. The reason for focusing on new democracies is because they may be more prone and vulnerable to ethnic voting. In new democracies, weak opposition parties inability to credibly promise to enact policies drives clientelism(Keefer, 2007). This leads to politicians distributing goods to targeted groups rather than providing public goods. In such an environment, voters are likely to respond to such appeals by voting along ethnic lines.

Furthermore, citizens in new democracies, according to Letki(Letki, 2018), tend to rely on ingroup trust compared to those in consolidated democracies. While not always the case, citizens in new democracies with an authoritarian past experiencing transition to democracy and a market economy tend to have on average high levels of trust towards immediate friends and family but low levels of trust towards strangers. They are less likely to take risks that involve trusting strangers and may on occasion try to exploit the other in worry that others do not share their values(Banfield, 1975; Uslaner and Conley, 2016). When people withdraw from wider contact, they will not be able to reap the benefits of social capital. They, according to Uslaner and Conley(2016), may at best become hermits isolated from civic engagement. At worst they might reinforce prejudices against strangers when they interact only with people like themselves (333). Social isolation resulting from low levels of outgroup trust can further divide societies, reinforce prejudices, and in some instances lead to conflict that can lead to the destabilization of democracy.

In general, new democracies, compared to consolidated democracies, may be more prone to voting along ethnic lines and have lower levels of outgroup trust. This, however, is not always the case; there is still variation in the levels of ethnic voting and outgroup trust among new democracies. Research shows that ethnicity is not always the key predictor of voting behaviors(Horowitz, 2019; Basedau et al., 2011; Houle et al., 2018) and that outgroup trust is not always low in all new democracies. According to Inglehart(1999b), people living in countries with legacies of oppression are less likely to trust their fellow citizens or participate in civic life.

In addition to variation in ethnic voting and outgroup trust levels, I have reason to believe social trust is a stronger predictor for voting behavior among new democracies than established democracies. Research focusing on the differences between new and consolidated, historically, Western democracies finds that, unlike effective and responsive political institutions present in consolidated democracies, states transitioning to democracies often suffer from institutional deficiencies early in their tenure (Huntington, 1991; Sorensen, 2008). In places where institutions are well-developed, as in the case of most consolidated democracies, people may be less reliant on social trust to navigate the world. Well-developed institutions, free of corruption and discrimination, can help people live their day-to-day life without the fear of being cheated and taken advantage of. In countries with underdeveloped institutions, on the other hand, people may need to rely instead on the help of their community, which includes strangers, to navigate their daily life. Furthermore, in consolidated democracies, it will be harder to tease apart the relationship between outgroup trust, institutional quality, and voting behavior as it is uncertain what factors enforce what. But considering the general low quality of institutions and outgroup trust among new democracies, it would be easier to tease apart the true effect of outgroup trust on ethnic voting. As a result, considering the weak institutional strength, I argue that outgroup trust is going to be a strong predictor of voting behavior across new democracies.

3.3 Theory on Outgroup Trust and Voting Behavior

In this section, I propose two mechanisms that explain the relationship between outgroup trust and voting behavior in ethnically salient contexts. They are the information receptivity and the collective action mechanisms.

3.3.1 Mechanism 1: Information receptivity mechanism

The first mechanism that explains the relationship between the radius of trust and the likelihood of voting across ethnic lines is the voters propensity to consider different types of candidate information. This cognitive explanation hypothesizes that the radius of trust determines whether a voter, when receiving information about co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic candidates or parties, credits or discredits that information. This explanation adds to the information and accountability literature, which examines the effect of electoral information on voting behavior. As voters have access to additional information on politics, thereby cultivating a more-informed electorate, the salience of ethnic identity divisions in democratic politics will be reduced.

The general argument here is that access to additional information on politics or cultivating an informed electorate may help reduce the salience of ethnic identity division in democratic politics.

While there is evidence that negative information on co-ethnic candidates or parties will dampen co-ethnic voter support (Conroy-Krutz, 2013), there is also evidence that voters selectively choose the information they want to consider when making their vote choice (Adida et al., 2017). Contrary to the general expectation that increased information about candidate quality will reduce the importance of ethnicity in shaping one's overall voting decision, Adida and co-authors instead find that voters engage in ethnically motivated reasoning where they consider positive information about co-ethnics as relevant and negative information as irrelevant to their vote choice. The opposite was true for non-co-ethnic members where voters considered positive information as irrelevant while negative information was relevant to their vote choice. In general, voters appear to choose what information they incorporate into their vote preferences based on their ethnic group membership.

I argue that increasing outgroup trust can dampen people's desire to engage in ethnically motivated reasoning and lead them to incorporate negative (positive) information on co-ethnic (non-co-ethnic) candidates or parties more seriously in their voting decisions. When trust is extended to those beyond their ingroup members, people may deem non-co-ethnic individuals as trustworthy and honest (i.e., as someone who would not betray them). For individuals with high levels of outgroup trust, positive information about non-co-ethnic candidates presents useful and believable information to consider when determining who to vote for, because the individual deems the non-co-ethnic members to be trustworthy and honest. As a result, these individuals, when provided both positive and negative information on co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic candidates, are more likely to consider all types of information when making their vote choice. With all the information they have on co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic candidates, they will be able to vote for a more qualified candidate with higher accuracy. As a result, voters with high outgroup trust (i.e., voters with a wider radius of trust) are more likely to engage in cross ethnic voting than the low outgroup trusting voters (i.e., voters with a narrower radius of trust), who are more likely to engage in ethnically motivated reasoning.




Figure 1: Causal chain from radius of trust to likelihood of cross ethnic voting
(Information Receptivity Mechanism)

3.3.2 Mechanism 2: Collective action mechanism

The second mechanism through which outgroup trust can encourage voting across ethnic lines is through its effect on a voters perception that non-co-ethnic and co-ethnic voters will elect politicians that are qualified and distribute public goods. This mechanism differs from the previous mechanism because it is not a story of information but rather about individuals expectations about others voting behavior. This is similar to the strategic selection mechanism theorized by Habyarimana and co-authors(2007), who argue that there are higher levels of public goods provision in ethnically homogenous communities because there exists a norm that cooperation among co-ethnics should be reciprocated and defections should be sanctioned. This theory assumes that in ethnically diverse societies, on the other hand, public goods provision is low as there is no unified norm of cooperation and sanctions.

The collective action mechanism proposed here frames individuals actions as also based on their expectations of others voting behavior, but not necessarily based on existing norms. I argue that individuals who extend trust towards non-co-ethnics are more likely to believe their out-group counterpart will cooperate and not defect in their voting decisions. Voters, when calculating their voting strategy, consider not only the competence of the candidates or parties, but also the strategy of fellow voters. They want their votes to contribute to the overall outcome and are likely to cast their vote for a candidate who is likely to win and likely to benefit the voter after elections as a result. When considering the strategic characteristic of voters, how individuals view others, and their intentions becomes crucial for ones vote choice. According to Keefer, Scartascini, and Vlaicu(2019), social trust is important in increasing the quality of government because it lowers the cost of collective action of demanding a better government. They argue that if voters can trust the other to contribute to the collective good of monitoring and expelling poorly performing incumbents, there is a higher incentive for individual voters to vote for qualified candidates or parties. Furthermore, the ethnic voting literature suggests negative evaluations of non-co-ethnics play

an important role in motivating voting behavior. Across contexts, scholars have found evidence that prejudice and fears about the out-group plays a motivating role in co-ethnic voting (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Long, 2012). This is especially the case when there is social, political, and economic inequality across groups (Bates, 1974). In such contexts, individuals who hold prejudicial views are less likely to support policies that benefit the out-group (Sniderman et al., 1991). This complements the idea that ethnic voting tends to be prevalent in contexts where the other cannot be trusted, and thus that individuals will always vote in a way that disfavors the out-group rather than pursuing tactics that benefit the country as a whole.

Based on Keefer, Scartascini and Vlaicu (2019), individuals with high levels of outgroup trust are more likely to be optimistic about a non-co-ethnic voters openness to the idea of voting for a qualified candidate. High outgroup trusters, compared to low out-group trusters, will have lower prejudice towards outgroup members, and thus will tend not to think about politics from an Us vs. Them perspective. Rather, they are more likely to focus on what benefits not only their group, but the country as whole. In competitive electoral contexts, individuals, when thinking about their vote choice, are going to simultaneously think about who out-group members will vote for. Outgroup trusters are more likely to think about others as allies rather than enemies, who may hold the same type of mindset as themselves. In this mindset, they may predict that non-co-ethnic voters are less likely to vote along ethnic lines and instead vote for a competent candidate or party. As a result, the individual is less likely to engage in ethnic voting than individuals with low levels of outgroup trust. In other words, when voters are able to trust that non-co-ethnics will incur some costs of contributing to the collective good of keeping qualified candidates in power and expelling poor performing candidates, they are more likely to vote for the more qualified candidate, regardless of ethnicity.




Figure 2: Causal chain from radius of trust to likelihood of cross ethnic voting (Collective Action Mechanism)

3.4 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical discussion above, I propose three hypotheses.

H1. Individuals with a *high* level of outgroup trust are *more* likely to vote for a *non-co-ethnic* candidate.

H2. Individuals with a *high* level of outgroup trust are *more* likely to evaluate information on both co- and non-co-ethnic candidates in an objective manner and, thus are *more* likely to vote for a *non-co-ethnic* candidate (information receptivity mechanism).

H3. Individuals with a *high* level of out-group trust are *more* likely to trust that non-co-ethnic candidate voters will incur some costs of contributing to the collective good of keeping qualified candidates in power and expelling poor performing candidates, and thus are *more* likely to vote for a *non-co-ethnic* candidate (collective action mechanism).

4 Research Design

4.1 Data

To test the relationship between outgroup trust and voting behavior among individuals in new democracies, I used data from the Afrobarometer Survey and Global Leadership Project. I chose to examine new democracies in Africa because these countries are not only ethnically diverse but ethnicity is also a salient identity when it comes to political mobilization. Here, I employ the definition of new democracies used by Grewal and Voeten(2015), which includes countries that have a Polity IV score of 6 or higher for less than 30 consecutive years. There are 10 new democracies in Wave 3 (2005) of the Afrobarometer survey that fit this definition⁴ at 2005. I base this study on data from Afrobarometer Wave 3 as this survey wave included questions on outgroup (interethnic) trust and voting behavior at the individual-level.

The Global Leadership Project (GLP) is a dataset that offers biographical information on leaders throughout the world, including members of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and other elites who hold informal

⁴New democracies included in Wave 3 of the Afrobarometer survey are Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa

power(Gerring et al., 2019). This dataset includes information on the ethnicity of leaders, which will be used as part of measuring ethnic voting.

4.1.1 Outcome Variable: cross ethnic voting

The main outcome variable is cross ethnic voting at the individual level. Here, cross ethnic voting is a dichotomous variable, operationalized as whether an individual voted for a non-co-ethnic candidate or not. To measure cross ethnic voting, the ethnicity of presidential candidates was matched with that of the respondent. Based on Afrobarometer's "If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?" question, I made a list of presidential candidates or party leaders representing these parties of choice. Then the ethnicity of each party's presidential candidate or leader was identified using the GLP dataset. For those whose information was not available in the GLP dataset, I either located their ethnicity through a web search or left it blank. The errors that can arise from this coding will be discussed later in the limitations section. Once the ethnicity of presidential candidates or party leaders was identified, I matched their ethnicity with that of the respondent's ethnicity, as provided by the Afrobarometer⁵. I subsetted the dataset to only include respondents who had the choice of cross voting, which meant respondent whose ethnicity was not represented among the presidential candidates were dropped. Respondents who voted for a non-co-ethnic candidate were coded as 1 and those that voted for a co-ethnic candidate as 0.

4.1.2 Explanatory Variables

The main explanatory variable is outgroup trust. Outgroup trust is operationalized as the level of trust an individual has towards a non-co-ethnic member. This is measured using responses to the Afrobarometer question of, "How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Kenyans from other ethnic groups." This is an ordinal variable, in which the responses range from 0(Not at all) to 3(I trust them a lot).

To account for the information receptivity mechanism, I included a variable counting the number of media sources respondents use to get their news. The Afrobarometer includes questions asking respondents, "How often do

⁵The Afrobarometer questionnaire includes a question that asks respondents to choose their tribe. The list of tribes is provided by the Afrobarometer, so it is difficult to know whether there are possible sub-groups within these groups the respondents closely identify with

you get news from the following sources? Radio; Television; Newspaper.” The responses range from 0(Never) to 4(Everyday), and I compiled the three questions on these sources into one measure by adding the responses together, where lower values indicate low media access and high values greater media access. I make the assumption that accessing more types of media more frequently implies more openness to information. This question is not a direct measure of exposure to diverse information, which means results must be interpreted with caution. Using this measure, I examined the interaction effect of outgroup trust and information diversity, and how this affects voting behavior.

To test the collective action mechanism, a measure on individual’s frequency of political discussion with friends and family was included. The Afrobarometer includes a question asking, ”When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters?” The responses range from 0(Never) to 2(Frequently). Here, I assume that those who discuss political matters frequently are more likely to share their vote choice with friends and family than those who do not. As a result, those who actively discuss political matters are more likely to be knowledgeable about vote choice of others, which in turn will influence their own vote choice. Again, this is not a direct measure for one’s knowledge on the vote choice of others, therefore, results based on this measure must be interpreted with caution. Using this measure, I looked at the interaction effect of outgroup trust and active political discussion, and how this influenced the respondent’s voting behavior.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

A country fixed effects model was used to examine the relationship between outgroup trust and ethnic voting as I believe voting behavior at the individual-level are influenced by individual, regional, and country level characteristics. At the individual-level, I control for five factors: age, gender, education, economic status, and political trust. I include political trust into the model as previous studies find a significant relationship between outgroup trust and confidence in institutions(Cao et al., 2015), and I suspect political trust will be a significant predictor of voting behavior as people with greater confidence in the institution are less likely to rely on informal cues such as ethnicity when making their vote choice. To control for country-level heterogeneity, I employed a country fixed effects approach. Furthermore, I ran separate analyses for ethnic majority and ethnic minority group members as I suspect

ethnicity of respondents to be a significant predictor of voting behavior.

$$Y(\text{CrossEthnicVoting}) = X_1(\text{OutgroupTrust}) + X_2(\text{Controls}) + \text{factor}(\text{Country}) - 1 + e \quad (1)$$

5 Results

5.1 Summary Statistics

Variable	n	mean	sd	median	min	max
Cross ethnic voting (0=No, 1=Yes)	2943	0.28	0.45	0	0	1
Outgroup trust (0=Not at all, 3=Trust a lot)	2887	1.42	1.02	1	0	3
Age	2911	37.81	14.95	35	18	115
Female (0=Male, 1=Female)	2943	0.5	0.50	1	0	1
Education (0=No formal schooling, 9=Post-grad)	2929	2.91	1.97	3	0	9
Econ status: gone without cash income (0=Always, 4=Never)	2923	2.11	1.36	2	0	4
Pol trust: trust in parliament (0=Not at all, 3=A lot)	2762	1.94	1.06	2	0	3
Ingroup trust (0=Not at all, 3=Trust a lot)	2915	1.75	0.98	2	0	3

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Individual Level Variables: Ethnic majority

Variable	n	mean	sd	median	min	max
Cross ethnic voting (0=No, 1=Yes)	3052	0.67	0.47	1	0	1
Outgroup trust (0=Not at all, 3=Trust a lot)	3009	1.43	1.02	1	0	3
Age	3032	36.93	14.68	34	18	101
Female (0=Male, 1=Female)	3052	0.49	0.50	0	0	1
Education (0=No formal schooling, 9=Post-grad)	3044	3.17	1.94	3	0	9
Econ status: gone without cash income (0=Always, 4=Never)	3039	2.10	1.40	2	0	4
Pol trust: trust in parliament (0=Not at all, 3=A lot)	2837	1.75	1.07	2	0	3
Ingroup trust (0=Not at all, 3=Trust a lot)	3028	1.73	1.01	2	0	3

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Individual Level Variables: Ethnic minority

Table 1 and Table 2 reports the summary statistics for *ethnic majority* and *ethnic minority* individual-level variables included in the models. There are

a total of 2943 ethnic majority group respondents and 3052 ethnic minority group respondents who said they would vote for a party if the presidential election were held tomorrow. For *cross ethnic voting*, the main outcome variable, the responses are dichotomous where 0 is assigned to those who voted for a co-ethnic candidate and 1 for those who voted for a non-co-ethnic candidate. The average response score among the ethnic majority respondents is 0.28, meaning less than one third of the respondents said that they would vote for a co-ethnic candidate than a non-co-ethnic one (Figure 3a). The number of *ethnic minority respondents who said that they would vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate, on the other hand, is almost three times higher than ethnic majority respondents with the mean of 0.67* (Figure 3b). In context where ethnicity is a primary driver of voting behavior, the difference in distribution of cross ethnic voting between ethnic majority and minority respondents make sense as ethnic majority respondents are less likely to vote for an ethnic minority candidate that has a lower likelihood of winning given the ethnic makeup of the country population. On the other hand, there is a greater likelihood of ethnic minority respondents to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate as their vote is more likely to make a difference in the presidential election outcome.

For *outgroup trust*, the responses range from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates having no trust for outgroup members and 3 having a lot of outgroup trust. The average outgroup trust score among ethnic majority respondents is 1.42. This means the majority of respondents said that they have very little trust towards non-co-ethnic members. The average response among ethnic minority group respondents is similar with a mean score of 1.43. The level of *ingroup trust* is, on average, slightly higher than outgroup trust for both ethnic majority and minority respondents with a mean score of 1.75 and 1.73, respectively. Interestingly, the relationship between outgroup and ingroup trust is significant and positive with a high correlation level of 0.7 among both groups. This shows that in the African context, outgroup and ingroup trust are not zero sum attitudes but rather complementary ones that grow weaker or stronger as the other changes accordingly. The respondents are on average in their *mid-thirties, females, and has gone without cash income once or twice in the past year*. The ethnic minority respondents are slightly better educated than the ethnic majority respondents, but on average have slightly lower level of trust in their country's parliament.




Figure 3: Distribution of cross ethnic voting

5.2 Results from the Country Fixed Effect Analysis

Table 2 presents the results from the country fixed effect analysis using a subset of ethnic *majority* respondents. Overall, the results show *significant support for Hypothesis 1*. According to Model 1, ethnic majority members with a *high* level of outgroup trust are significantly more likely to *vote for a non-co-ethnic member* than those with low levels of outgroup trust. In this model, I also find education, economic status and political trust to be significantly correlated with cross ethnic voting among ethnic majority respondents. Ethnic majority group members with *higher levels of education and economic status* tend to vote for a *non-co-ethnic* candidate. Interestingly, I find that respondents with high levels of trust towards the Parliament are *less* likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate.

I find that outgroup trust for ethnic *minority* group members, on the other hand, has does not predict cross ethnic voting, thus finding no support for Hypothesis 1 (Model 1, Table 3). Education and economic status again are a positive and significant predictors of cross ethnic voting. Ethnic minority group respondent with *higher levels of education and economic status* are more likely to vote for a *non-co-ethnic* candidate than those with lower levels of education and economic status. Contrary to the ethnic majority group respondents, political trust is not correlated with voting behavior among the ethnic minority group respondents.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Cross-ethnic voting		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outgroup trust	0.022** (0.009)	0.040** (0.016)	0.030** (0.013)
Information access		0.0003 (0.004)	
Discuss politics			0.041** (0.016)
Age	-0.0004 (0.0005)	-0.001 (0.0005)	-0.0004 (0.0005)
Female	0.003 (0.014)	-0.0004 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)
Education	0.011** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)
Economic status	0.010* (0.005)	0.010* (0.006)	0.009* (0.005)
Political trust	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)
Ingroup trust	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)
Botswana	-0.528*** (0.041)	-0.520*** (0.041)	-0.521*** (0.041)
Ghana	-0.667*** (0.030)	-0.661*** (0.030)	-0.671*** (0.030)
Kenya	-0.449*** (0.035)	-0.442*** (0.036)	-0.450*** (0.036)
Madagascar	-0.505*** (0.036)	-0.504*** (0.036)	-0.494*** (0.036)
Malawi	-0.110*** (0.032)	-0.114*** (0.032)	-0.108*** (0.032)
Mali	-0.288*** (0.035)	-0.287*** (0.036)	-0.285*** (0.035)
Namibia	-0.650*** (0.029)	-0.645*** (0.029)	-0.646*** (0.029)
Senegal	-0.507*** (0.032)	-0.505*** (0.033)	-0.507*** (0.033)
South Africa	0.190*** (0.034)	0.197*** (0.035)	0.198*** (0.035)
Outgroup trust*information access		-0.003 (0.002)	
Outgroup trust*discuss politics			-0.009 (0.009)
Constant (Benin)	0.653*** (0.036)	0.652*** (0.042)	0.612*** (0.040)
Observations	2,653	2,621	2,629
R ²	0.404	0.408	0.405
Adjusted R ²	0.401	0.404	0.401
Residual Std. Error	0.349 (df = 2636)	0.348 (df = 2602)	0.349 (df = 2610)
F Statistic	111.835*** (df = 16; 2636)	99.542*** (df = 18; 2602)	98.566*** (df = 18; 2610)

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 3: Results for outgroup trust and cross ethnic voting among ethnic majority members in 10 sub-Saharan African countries

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Cross-ethnic voting		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outgroup trust	0.017 (0.012)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.016)
Information access		0.010** (0.005)	
Discuss politics			-0.044** (0.021)
Age	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)
Female	0.011 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)	0.011 (0.018)
Education	0.013** (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)
Economic status	0.021*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)
Political trust	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)
Ingroup trust	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.024** (0.012)
Botswana	0.176 (0.126)	0.161 (0.127)	0.176 (0.126)
Ghana	0.449*** (0.078)	0.438*** (0.079)	0.447*** (0.078)
Kenya	0.104** (0.044)	0.087** (0.044)	0.105** (0.044)
Madagascar	0.370*** (0.048)	0.377*** (0.049)	0.365*** (0.049)
Malawi	0.049 (0.044)	0.046 (0.044)	0.051 (0.044)
Mali	0.080 (0.058)	0.055 (0.059)	0.081 (0.059)
Namibia	0.137*** (0.052)	0.105** (0.054)	0.134** (0.053)
Senegal	0.423*** (0.047)	0.395*** (0.048)	0.422*** (0.047)
South Africa	0.047 (0.042)	0.017 (0.043)	0.043 (0.042)
Outgroup trust*information access		0.0001 (0.002)	
Outgroup trust*discuss politics			0.024** (0.011)
Constant (Benin)	0.458*** (0.050)	0.438*** (0.056)	0.498*** (0.054)
Observations	2,764	2,728	2,747
R ²	0.085	0.087	0.087
Adjusted R ²	0.080	0.081	0.081
Residual Std. Error	0.452 (df = 2747)	0.452 (df = 2709)	0.451 (df = 2728)
F Statistic	16.035*** (df = 16; 2747)	14.335*** (df = 18; 2709)	14.458*** (df = 18; 2728)

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 4: Results for outgroup trust and cross ethnic voting among ethnic minority members in 10 sub-Saharan African countries

5.2.1 Results for the Outgroup Trust Mechanisms

Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 and Table 4 include results from models that test the two mechanisms through which outgroup trust is hypothesized to effect voting behavior in countries where ethnicity is a salient identity. Model 2 examines the information receptivity mechanism, which argues that individuals with high levels of trust *and* high levels of candidate information accessibility are more likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate. For both the ethnic majority and minority respondents, I *do not find support for the information receptivity hypothesis* as the interaction term of outgroup trust and information access (*outg_trust:information_acc*) is not significant. As a result, I *do not find support for Hypothesis 2*. Outgroup trust (*outg_trust*) among the ethnic majority group respondents is still positive and significant even after accounting for the level of information receptivity. On the other hand, outgroup trust for ethnic minority respondent remains insignificant, but the information access variable (*outg_trust:information_acc*) is positive and significant. This can be interpreted as ethnic minority group respondents with greater access to information (news) via various media sources (e.g. radio, television, newspaper) are more likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic than individuals with low levels of information access.

Models 3 in Table 3 and Table 4 examine the collective action mechanism, which states that individuals with a high level of outgroup trust and a high level of information on the voting decision of ingroup and outgroup members are more likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic. Results in Model 3 in Table 4 lend *support for Hypothesis 3*. The interaction term of outgroup trust and political discussion (*outg_trust:discuss_pol*) among ethnic minority group respondents is positive and highly significant. The interpretation for the interaction term coefficient is visualized in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for cross ethnic voting with interactive term among ethnic minority group members (outg_trust*discuss_pol)

As the plot shows, outgroup trust has a different effect size on cross ethnic voting depending on the amount of political discussion the respondents had with friends and family. For those with the lowest frequency of discussion with friends and family (red line), outgroup trust is negatively correlated with cross ethnic voting. On the other hand, outgroup trust is a significant and positive predictor of individuals with the highest frequency of political discussion (blue line). Respondents with a high level outgroup trust that frequently discuss politics are significantly *more* likely to vote across ethnic lines than respondents with the same level of outgroup trust but who rarely discuss politics with their family and friends. Overall, my hypothesis on the collective action mechanism is supported, however, such finding can be found only among the ethnic minority member respondents.

6 Alternative Explanations for Minority Group's Voting Behavior

So if outgroup trust is only a conditional predictor for cross ethnic voting among ethnic minority group members, what better explains for the variation of votes across ethnic lines? In this section, I offer an alternative explanation for what drives members of ethnic minority groups to vote across ethnic lines. In contexts where ethnicity is a salient identity, it is plausible to think that members of majority and minority groups think and navigate the world in a different manner. Members of dominant ethnic groups, given their superior political and socio-economic status, may not take their privilege into calculation when casting a vote. Since these members live in a society where they have the upper hand, ethnic status will be less relevant to their daily life. As a result, when these individuals cast a vote, the ethnicity of the candidate may be one of the many factors taken into consideration, but it will not be the central criteria for decision.

Members of minority groups, on the other hand, live in a world where their ethnic identity poses a barrier to their socio-economic and political activities. Since discrimination based on ethnicity is more prevalent for ethnic minority group members than ethnic majority group members, ethnic identity will be salient not only in their day to day to life, but also when it comes to political decisions. I suspect individuals from ethnic groups that are disadvantaged politically and socio-economically are less likely to vote across ethnic lines than those who believe their group to be stable. This is because individuals who believe their group to be discriminated are more likely to want to preserve or expand their political power in order to promote a better life for their ethnic group members. To test this hypothesis, I examine how the respondent's self evaluation of their ethnic group's economic and political status correlates with their likelihood of voting across ethnic lines.

To measure self evaluation of ethnic minority group's economic and political status, I use the following questions. For economic status, the question asks respondents, "Think about the condition of [R's Ethnic Group], are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in the country?" The responses range from 1 or much worse and 5 or much better. On average, respondents scored 3.143, which indicates their group's economic status to be the same as the other groups in the country. For political status, the questions asked respondents, "Think about the condition of [R's Ethnic Group], do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other

groups in this country?" The answered range from 1 or much less and 5 or much more. Respondents, on average, scored 3.034 or evaluating their group's political status to be the same as other groups in the country.

According to results in Table 5, self evaluation of their group's economic and political status are both significant predictors of cross ethnic voting. The economic status of ethnic minority group, on the one hand, is positively correlated with the outcome variable, which can be interpreted as the worse the ethnic minority group member perceives their group's economic status to be, the more likely they are to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate. Political status, on the other hand, has an opposite relationship with cross ethnic voting in that the worse off the respondent evaluates their group to be politically, the less likely they are vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate. While the negative relationship between political status and cross ethnic voting among ethnic minority group respondents is unsurprising, the results of economic status strikes me as an odd one. I expected ethnic minority group members to want to improve their group's economic status by voting for a co-ethnic candidate as they did for political status, but results show the opposite. Those who believed their group to be economically disadvantaged were more likely to cede power to a different ethnic group. This perplexing result can be interpreted as voters in ethnically salient contexts think about economic and political power in relation to their group differently. Perhaps ethnic minority groups view political power as a zero-sum concept where a non-co-ethnic candidate coming to power as a reduction of their group's political status. On the other hand, it may be the case that they view economic progress as a collective effort and believe the candidate with the right qualifications deserve to be in power regardless their ethnicity. The theory, however, needs further investigation.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Cross-ethnic voting	
	(1)	(2)
Group's economic status	-0.028*** (0.009)	
Group's political status		0.040*** (0.009)
Age	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)
Female	0.012 (0.018)	0.008 (0.018)
Education	0.012** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)
Economic status	0.017** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)
Political trust	-0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)
Botswana	0.176 (0.126)	0.186 (0.126)
Ghana	0.448*** (0.078)	0.454*** (0.079)
Kenya	0.100** (0.044)	0.112** (0.044)
Madagascar	0.352*** (0.048)	0.398*** (0.049)
Malawi	0.038 (0.043)	0.058 (0.043)
Mali	0.069 (0.058)	0.090 (0.059)
Namibia	0.115** (0.053)	0.162*** (0.053)
Senegal	0.399*** (0.045)	0.423*** (0.046)
South Africa	0.029 (0.042)	0.064 (0.043)
Constant (Benin)	0.553*** (0.060)	0.288*** (0.058)
Observations	2,734	2,690
R ²	0.086	0.093
Adjusted R ²	0.081	0.088
Residual Std. Error	0.452 (df = 2718)	0.451 (df = 2674)
F Statistic	17.028*** (df = 15; 2718)	18.241*** (df = 15; 2674)
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01	

Table 5: Results for minority group's status and cross ethnic voting among ethnic minority members in 10 sub-Saharan African countries

7 Discussion and Conclusion

In conclusion, *the country fixed effects analysis finds a significant relationship between outgroup trust and cross ethnic voting at the individual-level across 10 sub-Saharan countries.* This relationship, however, is conditional on the individual's ethnic group status. The hypothesized positive correlation between outgroup trust on cross ethnic voting is observed only among the ethnic majority respondents, but not the ethnic minority individuals. For the ethnic majority members, I find that outgroup trust is positively correlated with cross ethnic voting. Regarding results testing for the hypothesized mechanisms, I find no support for the information receptivity mechanism. For the *collective action mechanism, I find support only among ethnic minority group respondents where frequent discussers with high levels of outgroup are most likely to vote for a non-co-ethnic candidate.* Rather, self evaluated economic and political status are better predictors of cross ethnic voting among ethnic minority group respondents.

This study is suffers from a number of limitations. First, the main outcome variable, cross ethnic voting, has two major drawbacks. First, party leaders may have more than one ethnicity to which they appeal to (Adida et al., 2016). As a result, my simplified method of matching the candidate's primary ethnicity to that of the respondents would result to Type II error (false negative). Voters could have responded to the candidates' secondary or spousal's ethnic appeal, but I could have miscoded it as non-ethnic voting because of my focus on the candidates' primary ethnicity. The second issue with this measurement is that not all parties mobilize constituents along ethnic lines. While some parties may mobilize their constituents according to their ethnic identity, others may appeal to their voters using other issues (e.g., income groups, ideology, policy, etc.). By assuming all parties as ethnic, I could have committed a Type I error (false positive), where I miscode respondent's voting decision as ethnic voting in cases where the non-ethnic party's ethnicity and the respondent's ethnicity happened to match.

This study makes some significant contribution to the literature on social capital and ethnic voting. While past studies have theorized and empirical proven social capital's effect on political participation, it has yet to make direct connections to voting in ethnically salient contexts. Results show that trust across ethnic groups is significantly correlated with voting in places where politics is influenced by ethnic identity. Furthermore, this study also speaks to the ethnic voting literature as trust across ethnic groups can explain for some

variation in the level of ethnic voting across individuals and countries. This shows that trust across ethnic group is taken into consideration when deciding who to vote for in the presidential election across sub-Saharan countries.

To better understand the relationship between outgroup trust and cross ethnic voting and its mechanisms, future research must do the following. First, cross ethnic voting at the individual must be measured more accurately. As aforementioned, I should be able to distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic parties, and better determine which ethnic groups the ethnic parties are mobilizing. Second, to better account for the mechanisms, I should come up with better measures for information receptivity and collective action. To measure whether an individual is being exposed to a wider variety of information on both co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic candidates, I should be able to determine whether the media sources they access are biased or not. It could be possible that one is accessing media channels that are biased towards one's ingroup. In this case, they could be exposed to more information but it would be heavily biased, which may motivate one to vote along ethnic lines. To better account for the collective action mechanism, I need to find a better measure for one's knowledge of not only their in-group member's voting intentions but also that of the out-group members'.

8 Appendix

8.1 Variable Measurement and Data Source

Afrobarometer Wave 3 (2005)

- Voting: Q99 If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?
- Outgroup trust: Q84D How much do you trust each of the following types of people: [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] from other ethnic groups? (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little bit, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot)
- Age: Q1 How old are you?
- Gender: Q101 Respondent's gender (1=Male, 2=Female)
- Education: Q90 What is the highest level of education you have completed? (0= No formal schooling, 1= Informal schooling (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ High school, 5=Secondary school completed/High school, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a technical/polytechnic/college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate)
- Economic status: Q8E Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: A cash income? (0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always)
- Political trust: Q55B How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Parliament/National Assembly? (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little bit, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot)
- Information access: Q15(A-C) How often do you get news from the following sources? Radio; Television; Newspaper (0=Never, 1=Less than once a month, 2=A few times a month, 3=A few times a week, 4=Every day). I added the responses from the three questions.
- Political discussion: Q17 When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters? (0=Never, 1=Occasionally, 2=Frequently)
- Majority: Q79 What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.

- Ingroup attachment: Q84C How much do you trust each of the following types of people: People from your own ethnic group? (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little bit, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot)
- Minority economic status: 80A Think about the condition of [R's Ethnic Group] Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in the country? (1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better)
- Minority political status: 80B Think about the condition of [R's Ethnic Group] Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country? (1=Much less, 2=Less, 3=Same, 4=More, 5=Much more)

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